The Brave New World-style utilitarian dystopia is a familiar feature o f the cultural landscape; Kantian dystopias are harder to come by, perhaps because, until Rawls, Kantian morality presented itself as a primarily personal rather than political program. This asymmetry is peculiar for formal reasons, because one phase o f the deliberative process on which Kant insists is to ask what the world at large would be like if everyone did whatever it is one is thinking of doing. I do not propose to write a Kantian Brave New World myself, but I am going to ask, o f what these days is called "the Cl-procedure," what would happen if everybody fol lowed it. I will argue that if the Cl-procedure works as advertised, it exposes a practical incoherence in the commitment to having it govern o n e's actions: in the Kantian vocabulary that goes with the territory, that the Categorical Imperative gives rise to a contradiction in the will, (Less formally, that it is self-refuting.) My target will be a recently influential interpretation of Kant, due primarily to John Rawls and a number o f his students, most promi nently Onora O 'Neill, Christine Korsgaard, and Barbara Herman, a group I will for convenience refer to as the New Kantians.1 Although it does draw on earlier interpretative work, this body o f writing is rela tively self-contained, and manageable in a way that the Kant literature as a whole no longer is. I d on 't myself wish to take a stand on whether the New Kantian reading is exege tic ally correct; it suffices for present purposes that it has proven itself interesting, plausible, and powerful enough to have moved Kantian moral philosophy back from the mar ginalized position it occupied a little over a quarter-century ago to the center o f contemporary ethics.
will be focusing only on the first, namely, on Kant's insistence that one act only according to maxims o f which one can at the same time will that they becom e universal laws.2 So the first task on our agenda will be describing how the New Kantians reconstruct that demand.
1.
The first formulation o f the Categorical Imperative supplies a test for the permissibility o f a proposed action. The New Kantians render this test procedurally, and have com e to call it the Cl-procedure.3 When it occurs to you to do something, you are to 1. Identify the maxim of the action.
The maxim is the "subjective principle o f volition" {G 400 n.) that underlies the action. It captures your understanding o f the action and of why you are proposing to perform it. The New Kantian account depicts maxims as having something like a logical form:
In circumstances C, to do A, because P.
Here A is a description o f the type o f action; C specifies the occasions that are to trigger actions o f type A; and P specifies the point of the action.4 2. Consider the maxim universalized, that is, imagine a world (a "perturbed social world," in Rawls's phrase) in which everyone in your circumstances (that is, in circumstances that share with the one at hand the features you understand to be relevant) does what you are proposing to do. What this comes to is best made clear by example, but before I get to that, a couple of clarificatory remarks. First, although I have described the procedure as something you pause to execute before going ahead with an action you have in mind, the Kantian requirement is o f course not that you stand around muttering to yourself before you do any thing. The procedure is meant as a rational reconstruction of the delib erative background to a decision properly arrived at, in pretty much the way that Aristotelian practical syllogisms are meant to reconstruct a somewhat different kind of deliberative background to action {Rawls 2000,218).
If you can't do this-if such a world is literally inconceivableor if the intention expressed in your maxim is bound to be
Second, the NewKantians understand the point of the Cl-procedure to be practical consistency.6 The idea is that self-frustrating plans of action are the analogues, in practical reasoning, of the kind of incoher ence that contradictory beliefs amount to in theoretical reasoning. Uneon troversial models for such self-frustration can be found in means-end incoherence, as when you decide to go to New York, but tear up the ticket that would get you there, or (to borrow an example from Garry Trudeau (1996, 104)) when someone decides he should have gone to medical school, but that dropping out of high school was definitely the right choice. You cannot coherently intend a self-frustrat ing plan o f action, and the Cl-procedure is presented as a way of check ing whether what you are proposing is something that you can coherently intend. It is not (as such illustrious readers as John Stuart Mill have believed) a way of checking whether the results o f everybody acting as you propose would be to your liking. I will defer to another occasion the question of why intentions that fail the Cl-procedure are supposed to be on a par with self-frustrating plans; for now, we need to bear in mind that courses o f action with genuinely awful consequences can pass the Cl-procedure, which is to say that it is a deeply nonconsequentialist way o f thinking about what to do. The question is: "Canyon (not: do you) will that everybody do as you are proposing to do your self?" Kant illustrates his proposal with four examples, and because it is important for the subsequent argument to have the moves clearly laid out, I will walk through four examples as well, construing them as the New Kan dans do. However, Kant's treatment of suicide is hard to bring into line with the New Kantian reading (and in fact it is not easy to see how suicide is an appropriate example of Kant's claims on just about anybody's reading). Because we do not want to skimp on exemplary contradication-in-the-will arguments before proceeding to develop our own, I will substitute an alternative, the recent New Kantian argument against violence.
Lying. Suppose your maxim is: to lie about whether you can and will pay back your creditor, whenever you need a loan that you're not in a position to repay-the point of your action being, of course, to get the money. If we think about a world in which everybody lied in these cir cumstances, we realize that in that world your plan of action could not possibly be effective; no creditor would believe you, and the lie would not work. Willing both a world in which everybody does as you do, and that your lie be effective, is something very much like adopting a selffrustrating plan (though, again, we haven't said why you have to be committed to both sides of the "plan"). Therefore, lies of this type are stricdy impermissible. Restrictions generated by failure at the contra diction^ n-con cep tion stage are "perfect duties"; there are no excep tions to the prohibition on acting on this maxim. ?
Before moving on to the next example, I want, for reasons that will be apparent in the sequel, to give this one a little more discussion than it usually gets. Kant's argument seems to depend on an empirical premise-that a practice of lying will undercut its own effectivenessthat is obviously often false.8 Airlines, for instance, routinely publish schedules that they know they cannot meet; their maxim is, roughly, "When it will allow us to utilize our capital more efficiently, we will announce schedules we can't possibly stick to, in order to increase rev enue." But {as you can confirm by looking around, the next time you are in an airport) passengers have not ceased to believe the schedules: they are surprised and upset when their flights are delayed, they have plans made around their flights' scheduled arrival times, and they are completely unprepared when they turn out to have missed their con nections.® As a matter of psychological fact, people simply do not behave in the way that Kant's argument says they do. There are two ways we might approach this problem, and I just want to indicate what the Kantian's choice is. He can treat the premise as empirical, and reshape his moral arguments around whatever the psychological facts turn out to be. Or, and I am myself inclined to think that this option is the more Kantian in spirit, he can treat it as prescriptive: Kant is on about how people are supposed to reason, and not about how they actu ally do. A rational agent should stop believing when it is obvious that there is a practice of lying; and we are to draw our moral conclusions on that basis rather than the empirical one. 10 Mutual Aid. Suppose one of your maxims is: when someone needs a hand, not to help out, because you have other things to do with your time. Now, a world in which no one helps anyone else is {at first glance) conceivable.11 But such a world would frustrate, not perhaps the inten tion expressed in the maxim, but a practical commitment you are bound to have to your own agency. In the Kantian picture, to be a ratio nal agent is to be a creature that deliberates about, settles on, and then pursues its own ends. You have no way of knowing, now, what ends you will settle on down the road.12 But you do know, humans being what they are, that if people are going to be agents worth the name, they will adopt projects that they cannot manage entirely on their own, and what is more, that the need for assistance crops up frequendy enough in situations where there are no formal arrangements for assuring and compensating it. I decide to move my kitchen table, and so I have to get someone to lift the other end. I am lost, and since what I am is lost, the person from whom I have to ask directions is someone I do not already have anything like a contractual relationship with: I will have to ask a stranger for a favor. A world in which no one helps out will be a world in which the pursuit of your ends will predictably (often but not neces sarily always) run aground. To will such a world is to will a world in which your agency is routinely frustrated, and your stake in your own agency is such that this would amount to a contradiction in your will. The "maxim of indifference" must be rejected.
Development of Talents. 'Talent' is here a misleadingly highfalutin word for the specialized skills of one kind or another that pursuing your ends is almost bound to require. There are many projects that you might reasonably adopt that would require driving to bring them off, and so being able to drive counts as a "talent" in the appropriate sense. It is an empirical but unavoidable fact about human agency that you yourself cannot be expected to have all the necessary skills; social arrangements built around the division of labor make it reasonable to expect that suitable resources of this kind will be available at the appro priate stages of your project. A world in which no one takes opportuni ties to develop his talents is, at first glance, anyway, conceivable.13 But in such a world, those capacities are unavailable to you as resources, and your stake in your own agency-in the New Kantian reading, a kind of necessary end-is bound to be frustrated. Therefore, you can not will a world in which the maxim we are considering is universalized, and the maxim must be rejected.14 Because Kant holds that the contradiction in the last two cases is in the will, rather than in conception-in the New Kantian reading, that the plan of action is not itself self-frustrating, but that when it is taken together with other ends that you necessarily have, these are jointly mutually frustrating-he holds that it gives rise to "imperfect duties." You obviously cannot develop all the useful specialized skills and capac ities; you obviously cannot help out every time someone needs it. The argument is supposed to show that you have to help sometimes, and that you have to develop some skill set; but just when to help and when not to is left up to you, and which talents to develop is also left up to you. 15 Violence-1® Suppose your maxim is to take violent means, and in par ticular to kill, when that will promote your interests and projects. Being a victim of violence generally, and being killed in particular, tends to interrupt one's plan of action. {There are odd exceptions-for instance, when being bludgeoned to death is actually part of your plan.)17 In a world in which everyone acted on this maxim, your agency in general would be ineffective because interrupted, and whatever project you are currently pursuing via the maxim would be interruptable.1® That your current project be interrupted (or anyway interruptable by anyone else in pursuit of their ends), or that your agency generally be aborted or abortive, is not something you can coherendy will. The violence-endorsing maxim must be rejected.
Notice a few features of New Kantian applications of the Cl-proce dure that turn on contradiction in the will (that is, of the latter three examples). First, they exploit deep facts about specifically human agency-about the range of ends that it is reasonable to expect humans to adopt, about the inability of human beings to do everything for themselves, or to acquire all the skills their projects are likely to need, and about the vulnerability of human agency to violent interruption. These are facts about people, not necessary features of agency. There might be creatures of whom none of this was true, creatures whose indi vidual capabilities, skill sets, and robustness extended well beyond the range of their reasonably adopted ends, rather than falling short of it. If we were characters from Road Runner, the New Kan dan argument against violence would not go through: when Wile E. Coyote is crushed under a falling rock, he emerges slightly crumpled, but still ready to order the next Acme product. Second, the argument does not suppose that all conceivable projects, or even the projects you have actually undertaken, will be aborted if others do not come to your aid, etc.19 If the argument is to work, the requirement must be rather that the world of the universalized maxim pose enough of an impediment to the range of projects that a rational deliberator-a creature that sets its own ends-might well adopt. And third, what drives the argument in each case is your stake in your own effective agency, which makes it impos sible for you to coherently endorse a commitment to arrangements that would very broadly undermine it.
2.
New Kantians are committed to actions coming in all sizes and levels of abstraction. And refrainings and omissions can count as actions, pro vided that they are governed by one's intent in the same way that more obvious actions are.20 It follows that governing one's activity by the Clprocedure-that is, not performing an action if its maxim does not pass the Cl-procedure-is, anyway when one is "acting from the moral law," itself an action or plan of action. Like other actions, it can be the dictate of many possible maxims, but a maxim in line with the spirit of (New) Kantian moral theory would be:
When I am making up my mind what to do, I will act only on max ims that pass the Cl-procedure, so as to make (morally or ratio nally) permissible decisions.
Call this the C/maxim; Kantians are committed to requiring of agents that something along the lines of the Cl-maxim capture their volitional stance.21
New Kantian moral theory imposes the Cl-procedure as a test that all of one's maxims must pass. The Cl-maxim, which expresses the willing ness to adopt this constraint, is itself a maxim. Therefore, proceeding on the basis of the Cl-maxim must be contingent on its passing the Clprocedure.22
The point here is not that the Cl-procedure has to show that the Clprocedure is mandatory; to establish that, one would proceed by test ing a maxim containing the clause, "... not to act on the CIwhich is not what I propose to do. The thought is rather that because the Clprocedure tests the maxims you bring to it for practical consistency, you do not want a maxim to fail-even if you think of it as founda tional.2^ (Compare: in a foundationalist epistemological structure, we may exempt its foundational elements from having justifications, but we would still have cause for complaint if their contents turned out to have the form p A~'p.) I will now walk through the application of the Cl-procedure to the Cl-maxim; as previously announced, I will be attempting to show that the Cl-maxim fails at the contradiction-in-the-will stage of the proce dure. We have just completed the initial step of the procedure, that is, identifying the maxim that it is going to be run on. The next step is to represent the perturbed social world in which the maxim is universal ized, In the case of the Cl-maxim, this is a world in which all agents treat the Cl-procedure as a constraint on their actions. That is, they act only when they could will the maxim of their action to be universalized.
In willing that everyone always act in the way you are proposing, "as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a univer sal law of nature" (G 421), you are willing that you act yourself in the way you are proposing, as though governed by "a universal law of nature"; after all, "everyone" includes yourself That is, accepting the Cl-maxim involves, in your own case, understanding your actions as governed by, or as the deliverances of, lawlike policies. (I am not just bearing down hard on something Kant happened to say; I will in due course argue that the Cl-procedure can work only if its inputs are law like policies.) For a policy to be lawlike is for it to have no exceptions. So the perturbed social world is one in which, when anyone acts, he understands himself to be acting from a universal and so exceptionless policy that governs his action.
Of course we are not supposing that agents in the perturbed social world act on the same policies (except for the policy expressed by the Cl-maxim). Agents in that world do will that others acton the same pol icies as themselves. But "willing" has, in one's own case, consequences it does not have in others'. When I will that I act from a policy or according to a law, that has the effect of committing me to act (it amounts to an intention to act) in accordance with the policy. But when I ''will" that someone else act in accord with my policy, that need have no consequences for whether he does: most other people are not subject to my will. I also do not think we need to imagine that agents do not change their policies from time to time. They may decide that a previous policy was mistaken, and is to be replaced. What is required is that in so doing they understand themselves to have discarded one uni rs THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE SEI^-REFUTING? versal, exceptionless policy and to have replaced it with another. Kant has sometimes been accused of having a moral theory that generates exceptionless rules {that everybody has to abide by); that was a misper ception of a different feature of the view, which is that it operates on exceptionless rules (but different ones for different agents at different times) 24 What this means is that the perturbed social world of the universal ized Cl-maxim is one in which requests for exceptions to people's pol icies will be uniformly denied. We will have to proceed carefully here, making sure as the argument develops that we know just what this means. But meantime, notice that we are still on Kant's home turf. Kant diagnoses the immoral person as wanting to make an exception for himself (G 424); but if making an exception for oneself on one's own behalf is illegitimate, surely demanding that others make an exception for one must be illegitimate, too. Now 1 want to advance the following claim: successful agency requires exceptions from others' policies, in just the way that successful agency requires assistance from others, in just the way that it requires immunity from violence, and in just the way that it requires the avail ability of a rich set of skills all of which one cannot have acquired one self.25 If this is correct (and if the Kantian model arguments for mutual aid and the like work as advertised), then, by parity of argument, the Cl-maxim gives rise to a contradiction in the will: one's stake in one's own agency is such that one cannot endorse having it undermined by being deprived of the exceptions that are its precondition. And if that is in turn correct, then it is forbidden to act on the Cl-maxim, and Kan tian moral theory is (at least in its New Kantian rendition, and stating the conclusion informally) self-refuting.
Even though the analogous claims in the New Kantian model argu ments are not taken to need support, I am going to argue for this one. I will proceed first by giving examples of the kind of case I have in mind. Then I will give an argument meant to explain why cases of this kind are common enough to be an empirical but deep fact about human agency. Finally, I will take up the New Kantian's stock objection to treating the cases as my argument requires-that is, to treating them as bona fide exceptions-and give two counterarguments to it.
Parking in Milan: I'll change a real-life story around a little bit to get my first, very small-scale example. When I was visiting friends in Milan, I needed to run my bags up to their apartment before returning the rental car; I found myself on a one-way and heavily-trafficked street, with no on-street parking, and a barrier to keep cars off the sidewalk, which meant that I needed a small exception (the kind that involves blinking hazard lights) to the rule that governed the building's parking lot: only cars with permits. As it happened, the guard staffing the lot wasn't handing out exceptions, and my plans for the day had to be rewritten on the fly.
Trouble in High School: A former colleague of mine reports having been very bored in high school, and admits to frequently skipping classes ... so frequently, in fact, that she ought to have been kicked out of school. She never asked for an exception to the rule that gets you expelled for skipping class, but an excepdon was made: one to which she owes her college education, and so her currentjob, and so, indi rectly, much of the shape of her current life. In this example, the effect of not having an exception made for one is rather more dramatic than in the first.
The Tardy Contributor. A fellow academic who was editing a Festschrift had set a hard deadline for the invited papers. One of the authors cir culated a draft of his paper, and shortly before the deadline discovered a problem requiring major revisions. The editor granted an exception to the deadline; without it, the author would have had to withdraw the paper, which would have hurt the Festschrift, the feelings of its subject, and the author himself, who would have been hard put to find another venue for the commissioned piece.
Cases like these are recognizable enough (although we still need to take up the question of how they are to be interpreted). But are they common enough to make the availability of exceptions a precondition for successful agency? If the need for exceptions is only exceptional, it will not support the argument we are developing against universalizing the Cl-procedure. So I will now argue that exceptions will be needed on an ongoing basis.
Let's begin with a fact used by other Kantian arguments that we've already reviewed: that human agency is dependent on the cooperation of others. Human projects are vulnerable, the kind of projects that human rational deliberators reasonably adopt will outrun the resources that an agent can muster on his own, and they will do so frequendy enough to make cooperation a sine qua non. Once again, this is not being introduced as a necessary truth about agency. For all we know, there could be agents who were successful lone wolves, either because projects that wolves take on fall into a narrower range than ours do, or because wolves are much more resourceful than we are.
The behavior of others is a very large part of the environment in which we pursue our ends, and much of that behavior is policy-directed or rule-governed in any case; ex hypothesi, in the world of the univer salized Cl-maxim, all of it is. So the contribution that others make to our projects will (mosdy, in the actual world, and entirely, in the per turbed social world we are considering) come under the heading of rules or policies in force. So you will be able to pursue your projects effectively (without getting exceptions to the rules) only if policy-and rule-governed behavior gives you the cooperation you need. So we need to ask how likely that is.
It is obvious that your projects have to be chosen largely in ignorance of others' rules and policies. For one thing, most people's policies are unannounced. And perhaps more importantly, even if they were announced, no one could keep track of more than a handful of them. This is a special case of another empirical claim used in the Kantian argument for developing one's talents: that people can't develop all the capacities or skills they will need. The skill in this case is that of knowing what the rules of the game are; lawyers are a class of profes sionals who specialize in developing that skill for a smallish subset of the official rules of the game, and becoming competent in just such a small subset turns out to be a full-time occupation. In special cases, you may consult a specialist-a lawyer or accountant-before embarking on a project, but most of the time, that's just not feasible. Because it is typical of interesting or important projects that one doesn't know just how they will unfold, one doesn't even know whose rules one will run into along the way. (This is true of not-so-in teres ting projects as well; in the parking example, I did not know, when I made my travel plans, that I would have a problem leaving the car on the street.) As an agent, you choose your direction with only the most sketchy sense of what the other relevant agents' policies are likely to be.
It is as obvious that both individuals and institutions have to formu late their policies and rules in ignorance, for the most part, of your ends. It is not just that it wouldn't be logistically feasible to keep track of everyone's ends. In the Kantian picture of rational agency, the cen tral feature of such agency is that you can formulate and adopt new ends. You yourself can't predict what your own ends will be down the road (recall that the New Kantian arguments for mutual aid and for developing one's talents rely on this fact); a fortiori, others cannot pre dict what your ends will be either, when they are considering what rules to adopt.
Since each set of decisions-about what rules and policies others adopt, and about what ends and projects you adopt-is made in igno
rance of the other, the chances of their being suitably coordinated are very small indeed. Overall, we should not expect that others' policies will, as they are, deliver the cooperation that your projects {and you) need from them. Therefore, a condition on the successful exercise of your own agency is that others make exceptions for you. It is not for nothing that unions use work-to-rule as a threat.26
Let me pause to address a handful of worries. First, you may be wor rying that parking problems and their ilk are too small to drive a criti cism of Kantian morality. I certainly agree that we should not reject Kantian moral theory because on some occasion I could not find a place to park, but the smallness of such examples is meant to serve as an icon for what the world of human agency is really like. The perva siveness of such small problems means that, although one can probably do without an exception in this or that particular case, doing without exceptions in all of them will make one's remaining agency not worthy of the name.27
Second, you may also be worrying that the examples are not moral, or that the exceptions in my examples are undeserved. But the Kantian argument (on its New Kantian reading) is supposed to be driven by one's own stake in one's agency, and so that is what matters for the argument, not whether the subject matter strikes one as moral, and not what one does or does not deserve. Objections turning on desert and on what is and is not moral get the order of explanation backwards, because one of the great strengths of Kantian theory is that it purports to provide a criterion for inclusion in the subject matter of morality: to appeal to one's independent and prior view of what is a moral issue and what morality requires is to beg at least one of Kant's questions.
Third, the argument I have been developing, like other arguments for imperfect duties, requires one to make judgment calls about how often a given type of situation arises. My own judgment call is that the relevant situations really do arise often enough for your agency to depend on exceptions granted by others (and, although I have not emphasized this side of the argument, exceptions to your own policies granted by yourself-think of a landlord granting himself an exception to a self-imposed rule that prohibits him from renting to dog owners). But if you have not been convinced, recall that the argument is mod eled on the Kantian arguments for mutual aid and for the develop ment of one's talents; it will suffice for present purposes if one needs exceptions from others to roughly the same extent that one needs assis tance from others. This is much harder to gainsay: after all, one can go days or weeks at a time without needing to ask for anyone's help. That is, the fallback claim is that if the model New Kantian contradiction-inthe-will arguments work, so does this one.
In any case, this line of resistance has an analogue discussed by Kant, who remarks that a well-off individual is likely to be happy to forgo the promise of mutual aid.2® I have noticed that those who think we do not need exceptions as often as all that tend to be the high-SES academics; that is, there is a recognizable class bias to the objection. What is more, even observations that cut across class lines may understate the overall need for exceptions, because some regions (think First World econo mies) accumulate excepdons at the expense of faraway and lcss-developed parts of the world. {If the global ecosystem can't handle an SUV for everyone, and if Americans prcdominandy drive SUVs, then Amer icans are collectively taking an exception.) In particular, economic sur plus that can make excepdons seem unnecessary is itself a giant, economy-size exception, I expect that the insistence that exceptions are unnecessary often marks a deep sense of entitlement that accom panies their being consumed unnoticed.
Let me Field one further worry before moving on. If the perturbed social world of the universalized Cl-maxim is one in which people act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, then they will not lie, will lend a hand more frequently and with greater alacrity than is actu ally their wont, will have skills that make their assistance more effective than it now is, and so on. That world will be a much kinder and gentler place than ours, and even if exceptions are necessary for agency in our world, perhaps they will not be required in what we might as well call the Kingdom of Ends. But if they are not, then the contradiction in the will we have been pursuing is avoided.
Here we are really being asked to choose between two versions of the Cl-maxim, one of which has us take such effects into account (to pro duce what we can call a highly perturbed social world), and the other of which damps out the effects of the universalized maxim much more quickly {call its product the minimally perturbed social world). Recall that the point of the Cl-maxim (expressed in its final clause) is to deter mine whether some line of action that you are actually contemplating is permissible. But the highly perturbed social world is too distant from the actual world to allow you to assess the actions you must in feet con sider. Suppose that the maxim you are contemplating is: to Fill up your tank when you pass a gas station, so as not to run out of gas. Cars pre dictably kill and maim some non-negligible percentage of their passen gers, so in a Kantian choice of transportation system, automobiles would be prohibited; in the Kingdom of Ends, there are no cars. So you cannot turn to the Kingdom of Ends to answer questions about when to tank up. Appealing to the highly perturbing version of the Cl-maxim to determine what to do is adopting what is normally a self-frustrating plan of action: it amounts to either a contradiction in conception or something on a par with one.
3.
Until this point in the argument, New Kantians will find it easy to be concessive. It is hard not to allow that there are many cases where one needs what the man in the street calls an exception to the rule. But Kantians will have a complaint to register about the interpretation I have been putting on them: that they are exceptions in one sense, but not in another (and in particular, not in the sense my argument requires). Korsgaard has put the response in print, and so I will use her as my stalking horse; however, it is important to bear in mind that I am taking up her discussion notjust as an objecdon one could make to my argument, but as an instance of an objection New Kantians have to make: this is a forced move.
Korsgaard agrees that there's no general reason to suppose we can think of everything in advance. When we adopt a maxim as a universal law, we know there might be cases, cases we haven't thought of, which would show us that it is not universal after all. In that sense we can allow far exceptions.T he way she tries to accommodate this very pervasive fact is to allow that one's principles "be willed ... as provisionally universal," which is to say that we are to "think [a principle] applies to every case of a cer tain sort, unless there is some good reason why not." She invokes the Kantian comparison to causal laws, and reminds us that when we make causal claims, we usually invoke causal principles that hold only "all else equal." When we find an exception to a natural law, "we look for an explanation. Something must have made this case different: one of its background conditions was not met."
Here the important point is that the explanation must itself have universal (or provisionally universal) force. For this reason, exceptions can be incorporated into laws that are universal in form; and this requirement {or the analogous requirement, since maxims really do differ from natural laws) in the practical case runs as follows:
if a principle was provisionally universal, an d we e n c o u n te r an excep tional case, we m ust now go back a n d revise it, bringing it a little closer to the absolute universality to which provisional universality essentially aspires.
That is (and adjusting the terminology to bring it into line with the dis cussion so far), while (New) Kantians can allow that you may encounter cases that, you will agree, aren't properly handled by whatever univer sally shaped maxim you had adopted, what you are to do is not, strictly speaking, to grant an exception, but to replace your old maxim with a new one that handles the "exception," as it really ought to have been treated by the rule in the first place.30
This might be done by tacking the exception onto the maxim, as an extra clause, so to speak (one that you might not bother to mention the next time you state your maxim, but that is now understood to be part of it). Or you might reformulate the rule as a whole, so that separate mention of the class of exceptions wouldn't be needed. There are many ways, some more and some less elegant, by which this might be accomplished.31 What they share is an adjustment in the contours of your practical commitments, and what matters is that while this adjust ment may be very sensidve to, and picky about, details, it too is univer sal in form: you are now committed to handling other similar cases in the same way. Now Korsgaard thinks that "[t]he difference between regarding a principle as universal, and regarding it as provisionally universal, is marginal." This, lam going to argue, is a mistake; the difference makes all the difference in the world, and especially in the world of the uni versalized Cl-maxim. There are two things to notice here: first, that making an excepdon and building an exception-shaped twiddle into a rule work differently in the social world; and second, that the commit ment to revise one's maxim in such cases is itself a maxim, and has to be checked against the Cl-procedure as well.
4.
Recall the Kantian argument against lying: if lying in given circum stances was a practice, everyone would know that it was, and they would adjust their behavior in the light of that knowledge. (That is, no one would believe your lies, and you would never get that loan.) More gen erally, when working our way through the Cl-procedure, we have to assume that others are going to adjust their plans of action in light of what the rules are. Recall that I left open the question of whether this was to be regarded as an empirical fact, to be retained in the world of a universalized maxim, or a prescriptive constraint-a matter of how Kantian moral theory requires us to think about our fellow persons. I do not want to resolve this question now, so I will try to use cases for which both versions of the constraint are plausible.
It follows that there is a difference between a genuine exception, and an adjustment to a rule that accommodates a previously unnoticed class of cases: when thinking about the latter, Kantian theory requires us to consider how people will adjust their plans in light of the modi fied rule. (People who grant exceptions sometimes worry about setting precedents; another way to characterize the effect that now has to be taken into account is that Kantian exceptions always set precedents.) Let's return to our previous cases:
Parking in Milan Revisited. If everyone who needed to were allowed to leave his car in the lot with his blinkers on, people would soon nodce this option and start planning around it. They would count on being able to dash upstairs to make a phone call, or to deliver flowers, or whatever; and so they would plan on making that phone call or deliv ering the flowers. The parking lot would very quickly be full of briefly parked cars. The primary users of the lot would not be able to get in and out, and the visitor who needed an exception to the rule would generally find all the free spaces already taken. That is, what I needed to make my day work was an exception, and not an adjusted rule.
Trouble in High School Revisited. If it became the rule, roughly, that promising and bright high school students got to skip class with impu nity, they would soon realize that. An important incentive for attending classes would disappear, better students would stop coming to class, less promising students would be transformed into resentful secondclass citizens, and the effect would be, not to help out bright and prom ising students (the intent of the original exception), but to undermine their academic performance. Again, what is needed is an exception, rather than a modification to the rule.
The Tardy Contributor Revisited: Likewise, if it were discovered that deadlines could be broken, contributors would quickly realize this. And in fact they have; some authors routinely overbook themselves, knowing that deadlines do not have to be taken seriously. (If you're in the business, I don't need to tell you who the egregious abusers are.) Any volume with a sizable number of contributors is bound to have one or more such authors, and since other authors know that the volume will be delayed, they too plan on dawdling. Since no one really believes the volume will have a timely appearance, authors reserve their best efforts for other venues. The point of granting the original exception was to facilitate the appearance of a strong and timely collection, which point is precisely undermined by universalizing the exception. Again, what is needed is an exception, rather than a modification to the rule.
More generally, because rational agents adjust their plans to take account of changes in the rules (because they, quite correctly, come to count on the new rules), institutionalizing exceptions-writing them into the rules in the way that Kantian moral theory requires-tends to have perverse results. The results are perverse in the ordinary sense, that of giving rise to baroque and unwanted side effects (think of the tax code, to take a bureaucratic example); but they are also perverse in a technical and Kantian sense, that of undercutting the connection between the exception and its originally intended effect. Usually, granting an exception while institutionalizing exceptions of that kind amounts to what is, by Kantian lights, a self-frustrating plan of action.
There are of course two sorts of cases: those in which universalizing an exception undermines the point of granting such an exception, and those in which it does not. New Kantian arguments for imperfect duties turn on judgment calls (about how much of an impediment to agency a given social phenomenon will turn out to be); my sense of the terri tory here is that you can't get by just on the latter sort of exception s. But once again, if your sense of the territory differs, the backup claim is that such undermining happens to roughly the extent that you turn out to need help (and skilled help) from other people-that is, that if the New Kantian model arguments work, so does this one.
5.
Our first objection to treating maxims as "provisionally universal" was that there is a substantive difference between exceptions and changes in the rules, and often agents need the former rather than the latter. Our second objection is located on the side of the person dispensing exceptions, rather than on the side of the recipient. Kantian strategies need to be subjected to the Kantian consistency test. Accordingly, con sider the following second-order maxim:
When I run into a case that my (first-order) maxim does not han dle properly, I will revise my (first-order) maxim to incorporate the exception, so as to be able to act on rules that I understand to be "provisionally universal." Call this the Revision Maxim. If a Kantian is to find the Revision Maxim acceptable, it must pass the Cl-procedure; but there is a quick argu ment to show that it does not.
I have for expository convenience been speaking of agents adjusting themselves to changes in the rules, and recent Kantians may have found that turn of phrase worrisome; what we are supposed to be imag ining is not a response to change, but the steady-state social world of which the contrary-to-fact alteration is a permanent feature. (See, for example, Rawls 2000,171 f.) Now in the steady-state world where agents follow the Revision Maxim, most of their maxims will already be muchrevised. That is to say, they will be very complicated (in something like the way the legal code or the tax code is complicated). But it is a deep empirical fact about human beings-a fact on a par with their vulner ability and the limitations on how many useful skills they can acquirethat they are not very good, cognitively, at handling this kind of com plexity and detail. It is very easy to swamp human cognitive resources, and in a world in which one's maxims have had many exceptions appended to or integrated into them, they will be too complex to think with.
First, it will not be realistic to demand of agents that they be sensitive to whether their maxims are universalizable, because that will usually be too complicated a question for them to answer. The perturbed social world of the Cl-procedure is a complex abstract object, and you can think of it as beingalitde like a chessboard. Just as it is very easy to produce boards that are hard to see your way through (the starting state of the board is hard for anyone, including grandmasters and IBM's Deep Blue; that's why people play chess), so it is easy to produce perturbed social worlds it's hard to see your way through. Adding detail to rules makes it harder to see, and see one's way through, the structure of the perturbed social worlds they generate. (Compare the way the tax code evolves: policy makers fail to see that a provision they are intro ducing will create new loopholes, and that these will be exploited to the hilt; they then need to add further provisions, which in turn create fur ther loopholes; and so on. Kant himself seems not to have appreciated the problem here; he apparendy thought that making out the demands of the Categorical Imperative, first formulation, was within the reach of even the simplest intelligence. Kant has not been alone. Widespread awareness of com plexity as an obstacle to problem solving dates only to the 1960s, and even now the idea has just barely become respectable within economics and political science.34 For instance, with occasional exceptions such as Hayek, the insuperable difficulties of managing centrally planned economies were overlooked until very late in the twentieth century (and it is suggestive that the construction of a Soviet-style Five Year Plan bears a family resemblance to the mapping out of perturbed social worlds that we are now contemplating) .3d If the realization that it is often not cognitively possible to solve problems about complicated social structures is still being assimilated in the social sciences, we should not blame Kant for not having noticed it.
You may be inclined to think that the complexity of the perturbed social worlds generated by the Cl-procedure cannot be as intractable as all that. After all, there are domains-such as producing syntactically correct speech-that seem to be quite complex and in which humans do quite well.36 And you may be wondering whether perhaps the Clprocedure belongs in such a domain. To see why this is unlikely, con trast the almost effortless production of sentence after grammatical sentence (that gives the Chomskian hypothesis of a special-purpose hardwired grammar module whatever plausibility it has) with the pau city of worked examples of the Cl-procedure. Earlier on, I added the New Kantian argument against violence to the three examples that canonically accompany presentations of the Categorical Imperative. Despite the fact that violence is a very basic moral issue, it took Kantians some two hundred years to come up with the argument, and it is treated, in the New Kantian literature, as a noteworthy achievement; it is, in any case, one of the very few new applications of the Cl-proce dure. If humans came to the problem space generated by the Cl-pro cedure possessing anything like their innate competence with the syntax of natural languages, then the solved problems would not be nearly so few and far between, and this particular application would have been merely one more of a practically endless stream of them.
Even if treating maxims as provisionally universal is unworkable, it might still be tempting to think that the pressure for exceptions can be relieved, in a way Kantians would welcome, by building generic excep tion clauses of one kind or another into the contents of maxims them selves. (For instance, unless an emergency comes up," or . other things being equal," or "... unless an exception is needed.") An argu ment of the kind we have just assembled disposes of these proposals. When it comes to "other things being equal," there are indefinitely many such cases that might come up, we cannot estimate their fre quency, and they do not lend themselves to being neatly classified in advance. So when maxims contain such clauses, it is impossible to tell what their perturbed social worlds will look like. For maxims that have had their contents blurred in this kind of way, the Cl-procedure does not give definite results. The point of adopting a second-order maxim that dictates generic exception clauses in one's first-order maxims would be to rescue the Cl-procedure. So such a maxim founders on a contradiction in conception. This is why agents' maxims have to be treated as laying down exceptionless policies.
To recap: First, modified rules differ from genuine exceptions, and they tend to be self-frustrating when universalized. Second, acting on the Revision Maxim is what New Kantian moral theory requires of agents who make exceptions, and the Revision Maxim fails the Cl-procedure. This means that New Kantian moral theory cannot accommo date the need for exceptions. If Kantians cannot after all make exceptions, and if, as I have argued, exceptions are a necessary precon dition for successful agency worth the name, then the Cl-maxim does indeed give rise to a contradiction in the will.
6.
Before concluding the paper, I want to take up two related objections to the argument we now have on the table. These try to abort it by cir cumscribing the application of the concept of a maxim. To frame the objections, I am going to take a moment to introduce another element of the New Kantian picture, which I will call maxim hierarchies.
The third clause of a maxim, as the New Kantians construe it, spec ifies the end or point of one's action: to revert to an earlier example, "when I pass a gas station, to top off my tank, so as not to run out of gas." Now, that point can in general be understood as a further action or plan of action; the intent of that further plan of action can in turn be rendered by a maxim; and that further maxim will itself specify a fur ther point: perhaps, "when I am driving a car, not to let myself run out Now we can state the objections. First, at the upper reaches of such a hierarchy of intentions, there is a glass ceiling above which the poli cies are not to be considered maxims. In particular, being guided by the Cl-procedure need not be a maxim, and so such a policy does not itself need to be tested using the Cl-procedure. But if we exempt what we were calling the Cl-maxim (and similarly general or abstract poli cies, such as the Revision Maxim) from passing the Cl-procedure, then the argument we have just finished constructing will not go through. Since maxims were introduced as generic representations of the con tents of intentions or volitions, this amounts to saying that, while you are to act in conformity with the dictates of the Cl-procedure, this is not to be taken for a further intention on your part: in an older Kantian locution, you are to act in accord with, but not from, the moral law. Call this the Upper Glass Ceiling Objection.
The Upper Glass Ceiling Objection does not sound much like Kant, who is very concerned that one act, not merely in accord with, but out of respect for the moral law; Kant explicitly characterizes as a maxim an extremely general and abstract policy, "that I should follow such a law even if all my inclinations are thereby thwarted" (G 400); he also wor ries about how maxim hierarchies are going to top out, treating the Categorical Imperative as one of the possible basic postures an agent might assume.39 So the Upper Glass Ceiling Objection would have to be understood not as an explication of Kant, but as an amendment to him. Now, the Cl-procedure is motivated by the idea that it is important to assess, not your actions on their own, but why you do them; if you did not think that what mattered was the practical consistency of the voli tion, rather than the outcome effected by the volition, there would be no point to deploying the Cl-procedure in the first place. So it's hard to see why someone who cared only about conformity of reasons and rationality to some template would end up requiring this pattern to be conformed to in one's mode of producing action. That is, the move made by the Upper Glass Ceiling Objection is evidently motivated not by considerations that have their home in the (New) Kantian way of seeing things, but as an ad hoc response to the problem posed by our argument. Of course, that is not yet reason enough to dismiss it.
Second, it will be suggested that what we find at the lower reaches of the hierarchy are not, properly speaking, maxims. Only suitably gen eral principles, such as those mandating or prohibiting lying, are sub ject to test by the Cl-procedure; "specific intentions" are not,40 and so need not be exceptionless. Since the argument we have been con structing turns on the pervasiveness of needed but unavailable excep tions, if a glass ceiling below which maxims are not to be found is set suitably high, then the argument will not go through. Call this the Lower Glass Ceiling Objection. When running a maxim through the Cl-procedure produces a star tling result, there is an unfortunate inclination on the part of Kantian theorists to try to block the result by insisting that the input was not really a maxim in the first place.44 I am for my own part disappointed by how frequently that inclination wins out. Kantian theory is deep and interesting only when it is taken seriously, and I have found that facing up to the startling result is usually theoretically fruitful. Just for instance, the maxim, "I will buy clockwork trains but not sell them," does not universalize: if no one sells the trains, no one will able to buy them (Nell 1975, 76) . The moral really is that that intention is imper missible. (Morality requires more carefully conditionalized maxims, perhaps ones that are explicitly sensitive to the idea that being a toy col lector is only one of the many social roles you might contingently occupy.) Or again, it's a standard classroom example that maxims like "I will turn up at Times Square tomorrow" don't universalize. (There's not enough room for everyone.) The moral here is that introducing proper names into maxims produces contradictions in conception. Or again, Herman's example of a "puzzle maxim" that must be "set aside" is, "To always be first through the door." I disagree: the fact that this maxim is not universalizable is a very good candidate explanation for the fact that this sort of pushiness is, while not a big deal, nonetheless rude. That is, one option for the New Kantians (and the one that seems to me likeliest to produce richer results) is not to give up so easily on the intentions at the bottom of the hierarchy (but this means giving up on the Lower Glass Ceiling Objection).
A second option is to find a principled way of distinguishing the maxims to which the Cl-procedure applies from the more concrete intentions to which it does not. This seems less promising to me. One reason is that no one who has tried to introduce the distinction has made much headway at cleanly articulating it. Another is that the New Kantian tradition has seen the Cl-procedure as a test of practical con sistency. That way of motivating the Cl-procedure makes sense when its range of application is intention, generically understood. But what kind of distinction could support a more narrow notion of consistency? And why should practical consistency be required only of some special type of intention?45
The third option is to allow perfect duties to vanish from New Kan tian moral theory, and the centrality to the tradition of the perfect duties makes this tantamount to altering the content of Kantian moral theory almost beyond recognition. But if New Kantians cannot afford glass ceilings, then they are committed to maxims coming in all degrees of generality and abstraction. The New Kantian position may require that maxims share a shape-the logical form that is used to express the content of an intention that comes up to snuff-but their shape cannot constrain the level of abstractness of the maxim's con* tent. And this is (one more reason) why I have been using the looser 'point' to describe what the third slot of New Kantian maxims expresses; some people are finicky about the term 'end', and prefer to use it only for fairly concrete aims with definite termination points. But this notion of end is much narrower than what maxims must be able to capture.
7.
What lesson should we draw from the argument that we have just con cluded? Not the easy one, that we should give up on New Kantian moral theory. True, if con trad iction-in-the-will arguments establish imperfect duties, it looks as though we have exhibited a Kantian imperfect duty to violate the Categorical Imperative, and so that part of the position will have to go. But New Kantian moral theory would not have gotten nearly the attention it has if it were so intellectually impoverished as to be a one-idea view. I mentioned at the outset two other ideas tradition ally identified with Kant (the requirement that persons be treated as "ends in themselves," and the importance of autonomy), but there are many more: just for instance, the conception ofpersonhood as a prac tical rather than a metaphysical status, ingenious arguments against instrumentalist accounts of practical reasoning, and the suggestion that actions are to be thought o f as moves in the only game in town. (See Korsgaard 1996a, chaps. 13,11, Schapiro2001.) Showing that one of the ideas in the Kantian portfolio is unworkable leaves a valuable and still-diversified grouping of philosophical assets. (And in fact some New Kantians have over the past decades come to rest more weight on the so-called Formula o f Humanity in particular.)
It is also too early to go looking for constructive lessons about prac tical reasoning and morality-the kind of lessons that would help us frame improved accounts of one or the other. We ought first to develop a deeper diagnosis of what has gone wrong with the Categori cal Imperative, first formulation; but to come by that, we will need a better handle on the philosophical motivations of the New Kantian position than we now have, starting with an explanation of why an agentwills the universalization of his maxim (so that the contradictions exhibited by the Cl-procedure are contradictions in the agent's will). I do not think this question can be successfully pursued without turning from the New Kantians back to Kant himself, and that is an undertak ing for another time and place. So allow me to suggest an interim and methodological lesson. When you are working up your philosophical theory, always stop to check what happens when you apply that theory to itself. Sometimes that operation will not so much as make sense. Sometimes the result will be fast and reassuring. But sometimes, as we have just seen, it will not, and so the test of reflexive application is not one that you can afford to neglect.
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- 1 Rawls 1989 is an overview th a t appropriates the position it attributes to Kant as a p recursor o f Rawls's own constructivist political theory; Rawls 2000 makes available his very influential lectures. It should n o t be assum ed that the influence was all one-way; over the years, his presentation o f K ant assimilated m uch of th e work he had delegated to his students.
Nell 1975 focuses o n laying o u t the K antian deliberative procedure, pro viding a m uch less terse ren d erin g o f the view set o u t in O 'Neill 1989, chap. 5 (and m ore generally th ro u g h o u t the volum e). Korsgaard 1990 accepts O 'Neill's acco u n t of the proced u re and focuses on motivating it; Korsgaard 1996a develops a range o f K antian positions aro u n d the m otivated procedure, and is now probably the cen ter o f gravity o f this reading. W hile H erm an 1993 advances th e interpretation, it also breaks ranks on a n u m b er o f points, a n d in section 6 I will discuss the reasons H erm an 's views diverge from others in the group. I will n o t tie myself too tighdy to the nuances of any version o f the New Kantian view; I m ean my sketch o f it to rep resen t the shared stru ctu re fairly, b u t 1 do n o t want to imply th a t the fine p rin t is attributable to each an d every instance o f the class, I will flag im portant disagreem ents as I go, as well as descriptions o f th e ir view th a t New Kantians w ould themselves find controver sial o r prejudicial, 2 From G 421, with gram m atical m odifications. I will cite K ant's works using th e following abbreviations, in the translations following the tide: G: H erm an 1990, 150f,, 188, provides a useful com pilation of th e different form ulations o f the Categorical Imperative.
3 Despite the step-by-step presentation and occasional rem arks by the authors we are considering (H erm an 1993, 115, calls it an "algorithm "), the C l-procedure is n o t technically a procedure o r algorithm . P rocedures can be executed mechanically and are guaranteed to term inate; inspecting the steps in this one will show th a t neith er is tru e o f it; Rawls 2000, 166, acknowledges this point, as does Nell 1975, 73. Rawls's own work progressively distanced itself from the idea th a t the central problem s o f political theory could be ren d ered as w ell-defined exercises in gam e theory, an d I suspect th a t the "proce d u re " term inology is a holdover from an earlier stage in his developm ent.
4 Rawls adds a fourth "unless" slot that we can u n d erstan d to be included in IS THE CA TEGORICAL IMPERATIVE SELF-REFUTING ? C (2000,168) . Kant an d th e majority of the New Kantians think o f the po in t o f the action as its end; Kant in particular holds it to be a form al fact about actions th a t they have identifiable ends (C2 34, . I am being looser about this partly to accom m odate H erm an (1993, 221) , who quite plausibly insists th a t th e full desirability characterization of an action is to be rep re sented in its m axim, and partly for reasons I will get to in d u e course, 5 I'm fram ing the condition disjunctively because it's n o t always clear or agreed am ong the New Kantians which disjunct the test pivots on. See Nell 1975, 69ff; . H erm an 1993, 118; Korsgaard 1996a, chap. 3, esp. sect. 3; Rawls 2000,169; O 'Neill 1989, 96. B H erm an is som ething o f an exception; see note 45, below. 7 G 421 n., DV 390, 392-94. I d o n 't here w ant to take u p the question o f how plausibly the p e rfe c t/im p e rfe c t distinction can be tied to the step at which the C l-procedure is exited. For a New K antian review o f exegetical con troversies having to do with this distinction, see Nell 1975, chap. 4. 8 T he p o in t now is n o t th a t a practice th a t is unsuccessful for this kind of reason will be replaced by a different practice. As a m atter of fact, we m ore o r less live in th e world K ant describes, w here people lie to get loans as a m atter o f course. T hat is why loans are n o t m ade on th e basis o f such promises. M ort gage originators do n o t stay in business by trusting their customers; they make sure th e re is collateral to foreclose on.
Closer to hom e, letters o f recom m endation for the academ ic jo b m arket are an o th e r case w here, for the m ost part, th e discounting d o esn 't go nearly d eep enough. "His dissertation will certainly change the field he is in." "She is the best student who has ever com e thro u g h o u r program ." "T h e work he has d o n e as a graduate stu d e n t would m ake a successful case for tenure." Sound familiar?
Because Kant predates the tw entieth-century rep u d iatio n of psycholo gism, claims with prescriptive force are often presented in his work as descrip tions o f an idealized m ind. For some discussion, see A nderson 2001.
Presentations of the C l-procedure usually include a gloss to roughly the effect th a t in constructing your representation o f the p ertu rb ed social world you are to keep as m uch as possible o f the world as we know it intact. This is analogous to the way we reason ab o u t contrary-to-fact conditionals; when ask ing "W hat w ould have h ap p e n ed if p?" we im agine as m uch as possible o f the b ackground to rem ain as is. We have ju s t seen th a t it is still an o p en question w hether this is the app ro p riate understanding; however, see also the final objection in section 2, below.
11 Is it really conceivable? Perhaps not; a fem inist objection to H obbesian state-of-nature argum ents is th a t hum an beings are too vulnerable actually to grow u p o r live in such a world (Vogler 1995) .
*2 Again, this could be taken as an em pirical claim, o r as prescriptive, ab o u t how your choice has to look "from the practical p o in t o f view." (For develop m e n t o f this latter idea, see Bok 1998.) T h e prescription can b e motivated by a specifically m oral th o u g h t such as: ju st as you have to respect others, by leav ing them space to a d o p t a reasonable range o f ends, so you have to respect yourself, a n d n o t allow th a t range of ends to b e foreclosed to you. T he price of this kind o f motivation, however, would be building explicitly m oral consider ations into the conception o f practical rationality at the core o f the theory, (I'm grateful to G eoff Say re-McCord for discussion here.)
13 Again, is it really? It is suggestive that, while K ant seems to have thought that the no-talent maxim guided the way life was lived in the South Pacific, no actual h u m an society has ever operated on this basis.
14 This particular argum ent may n o t seem m u ch like K ant's (somewhat obscure) text, b u t it is a New K antian way o f h an d lin g the case; see O 'Neill 1989, 99. Kant does rem ind us that parents try to have th eir children develop a range o f skills that will serve whatever ends they ad o p t down the road (G 415).
13 For a reconstruction o f the argum ent th a t th e re m ust be "b ro ad obliga tions," that is, im perfect duties, see O 'N eill 1989, 230 . T he arg u m en t turns on the claim th a t o ne does n o t have available p rincip led ways o f delim iting o n e 's obligation m ore tightly. Kant provides a subsidiary argum ent to su p p o rt this observation th a t is, however, less plausible than the observation itself is: any fu rth er argum ent would establish a different g ro u n d o f obligation. (DV 403; com pare A787f./B815f.) 16 Loosely adapted from H erm an 1993, chap. 6; com pare K orsgaard 1996a, 98-100, N ell 1975, 79f. 17A nd m ore generally, as Cindy Stark has rem in d ed me, n o t all violence is an im pedim ent to agency; The Fight Club is a re c e n t film whose eponym ous institution can serve as an exam ple.
18 W hether this arg u m e n t is to be u n derstood as invoking a contradiction in conception o r a contradiction in the will depend s on how contradiction in conception is u n derstood (see note 5, above), an d on w hether th e form er or the latter o f these problem s is being em phasized. H erm an presents it as invok ing your stake in your own agency generally, and so as exploiting a contradic tion in the will; on that reading, the duty n o t to avail oneself o f violent means would be im perfect. I w ant to leave to one side h ere the question o f w hether we should be happy with an argum ent that makes abjuring violence o u t to be an im perfect duty; what does m atter is that the arg u m en t is end o rsed by sev eral New Kantians, being treated by them -and this is a p o in t for which I will have a use later on-as som ething o f an accom plishm ent.
19H erm an (1993 53f.) gives an argum ent m ean t to block the following objection: th a t you can avoid contradictions in the will by deciding to ad o p t only projects g u aranteed n o t to require resources provided by m utual aid, o th ers' talents, and so on. 20 I'll provide argum ents for these claims, as well as an explication o f what is m eant by the "size" o f an action, in section 6.
21 T h ere are o th e r possible final clauses for th e Cl-maxim, for instance, "o ut o f respect for th e m oral law." T h at would express the p o in t o f the action, b ut not perhaps an end. (1 say "perhaps," because while such respect is n o t any thing like a goal, Kant redescribes respect for persons as treating them as "ends in themselves," and persons are not, except in pathological cases, any thing like goals either; possibly th e right gloss o n K ant's term "e n d " would make an en d of respect for th e m oral law.) A n o th er alternative final clause IS THE CA TEGOR1CAL IMPERATIVE SELF-REFUTING T m ight be "to prom ote th e H ighest G ood"; I take it th a t the H ighest Good is best u n d ersto o d as occupying th e role, in K ant's account, o f th e form al end (but o f course n o t the determ in in g ground) o f m oral an d rational action-ingeneral. F or p resent purposes, however, it does n o t m uch m atter what the final clause o f th e Cl-maxim is taken to be, because final clauses do work at the contradiction-in-conception phase of the Cl-procedure, and n o t at th e contradiction-in-the-will stage. T he argum ent I am ab o u t to construct will n o t need to d em onstrate a contradiction in conception.
® Taking seriously the req u irem en t th a t the C l-procedure is self-endorsing conform s to the approach taken by New K antian m etaethics. Korsgaard, for instance, extracts from a historical survey th e lesson th a t self-endorsem ent is the only possible source o f normativity; she subsequently generalizes the firstcut requirem ent, o f a faculty's endorsing itself, to the general en d o rsem en t of all o f o n e 's faculties by all o n e 's faculties (Korsgaard 1996b, 62, 65f.) . O n both the less and the m ore stringent versions o f th e view, a faculty's flunking itself out should strip the normativity from its pronouncem ents.
23 Need th e sort of maxim we have in m ind be foundational? Perhaps you have som e reason for a proposal as im p o rtan t as: always acting o n the m oral law (respect for persons, o r a d eep com m itm ent to some set o f values; see note 45), And normally, when you get aro u n d to ru n n in g a m axim th ro u g h the Clprocedure, you already think th e course of action it proposes is a good idea, for som e reason or other. B ut K ant him self seems to have th o u g h t th a t ad h er ence to the Categorical Im perative could have no further ground; see n o te 39, below. T h at said, I d o n 't think we have to settle th e question here.
24C om pare O 'N eill 1989, 129f. But how could Kant have held b oth this view and accorded the im portance that he d id to im perfect duties? I think there really is a d eep tension in his view here, b u t the parts o f it th a t are o n dis play are formally com patible. T he im perfect duties are given as m andatory ends, n o t as maxims. Acting to prom ote a m andatory en d requires form ulat ing a m ore structured inten tio n -a maxim-that specifies what, on a specified class of occasions, you will do to prom ote th e en d . (The class o f occasions you specify may n o t exhaust th e occasions on which you will, in on e way o r another, act to prom ote th e end; those fu rth e r occasions will have to be cov ered by o th e r maxims.) Your m axim will th e n have to be checked for permis sibility, using th e universalizability test. For instance, to develop my talents is a m andatory end, b u t n o t yet a maxim. W hen I consider developing my talents by robbing banks, I now have a maxim, b u t this m axim fails at th e contradiction-in-conception stage o f the C l-procedure. {If everybody robbed banks, there would be no banks to rob.) So although I m ust find ways to develop my talents, I may n o t do it by robbing banks.
35 Rawls tries to deal with a related objection-th a t m oral restrictions will also get in the way o f plans you may have-by appealing to a special class o f interests, which he calls "true hum an needs"; th e idea is th a t these are tied to different kinds o f obstacles to agency (Rawls 2000, 173f.; such needs are an exegetical adaptation o f his own notio n of "prim ary goods"). So note th a t I am constructing th e argum ent so th a t there is no plausible difference o f this kind to which to appeal. there is som e plausibility to a reading o f the text on which perm issible actions turn o u t to be unique and so required, and on which K ant's vision o f th e king dom o f ends is rem iniscent of Leibnizian preestablished harmony. For now, we can say th a t th e New Kantians find this sort of rigorism uncongenial, both because it is n o t in keeping with the Zeitgeist, and because the p o in t o f their project is to reclaim Kant as a predecessor to Rawlsian liberalism, a position that tries to maximize, rath e r than maximally constrict, freedom o f action. We will provide a m ore principled reason for n o t falling back on rigorism below.
Over a n d above that, you m ight be w orried th a t your needing an excep tion shows that you did n o t have a (by Kantian lights) co h eren t in ten tio n in the first place. B ut since we ca n n o t anticipate the exceptions o u r projects will require, insisting th a t a p roject is coherently in te n d ed only if it will n o t require exceptions would unacceptably u nd erm in e agency.
28 G 423; we can im agine som eone wealthy en o u g h to pay for all the help he needs.
29 Korsgaard 1999, 25, my em phasis. Q uotations below are from pages 24 25 o f this same paper.
30 C om pare Hill 1992, a paper whose title announces its subject to b e a Kan tian treatm ent of exceptions, and which turns o u t to b e an attem pt to work up m ore nuanced reasons for m ore nuanced-b u t formally universal an d excep tionless-policies (in this case, "policies th a t involve taking the lives o f terror ists," and possibly bystanders).
O ne option th a t I have h a d suggested to m e is that the b u rd en b e taken u p by an A ristotelian sensitivity to when exceptions a re called for, (T hat is, the m ore com plex policy is to be im plem ented partly as the original, explicitly stated, b u t less com plicated policy, and partly as a disposition to notice the specified classes o f exception w hen they com e up; H erm a n 's "rules o f moral salience" are a New Kantian attem p t to integrate such patterns o f attention and recall into the K antian apparatus.) W hat m atters for present purposesand the read er should verify this as we walk through the argum ent-is that how the m ore com plex rule is im plem ented m akes no difference, first, to its social effects, an d second, to the cognitive b u rd en (com putational an d o th er wise) involved in following it.
Why ca n 't the problem be solved by integratin g th e accum ulating excep tions into cleanly form ulated rules? After all, som ething like this goes on in the sciences; why n o t in ethics?
I think th a t th e accretion of detail outpaces o u r ability to identify simpli fying patterns; th a t's visibly tru e o f such exam ples as th e tax code. I t's true in the sciences as well, and som e philosophers of science, like Cartwright (1983) , argue th a t the simplicity of the laws is consequendy purchased at th e expense of their truth. And there is a fu rth e r obstacle in ethics. Recall that maxims have to capture the motivations the agent actually has. Those m otivations are normally tied to a specific conceptual apparatus. Now, w hat we learn from the history o f such sim plifications in th e sciences is th a t they are accom panied by fairly radical conceptual shifts. B ut we can insist o n deploying a new set o f con cepts in o n e 's maxims only if they can sum m on up corresponding motiva IS THE CA TEG0R1CALIMPERA TIVE SELF-REFUTING ? tional structure. As a m atter o f sociological feet, change in such conceptem bedding motivations is very slow. So once again, we should expect the p ro cess of practical sim plification to fall ever farth er b ehind the accretion o f legit im ate exceptions to ou r rules. (For exam ple, an anti-Semitic maxim will express a m otivation tied to th e concept "Jew." T h a t m eans th a t we can 't effect the gestalt o r paradigm shifts th a t would re n d e r o u r maxims less com plicated, w hen those shifts would involve replacing th e con cep t "Jew," if we ca n 't get rid o f th e anti-Semitism.)
33 You may be inclined to look for m ore restricted versions o f eith er th e Clm axim o r th e Revision Maxim; in that case, notice w here th e strategy lands you. T he K antian account needs m achinery to prev en t tailored versions of intentions to lie, cheat an d steal from slipping th ro u g h the C l-procedure. (See note 38, below, for a terse recapitulation o f the problem .) So a restricted ver sion of, say, the Revision Maxim needs to com e with a motivated account o f the machinery, an d an argum ent dem onstrating how, in light o f th a t account, p ro posed revisions to the Revision Maxim are n o t blocked (even though unac ceptable revisions to lying m axims and th e ir ilk are). 1 d o n 't have a tight argum ent showing that n o such proposal can work-th a t's because it's h ard to have a good enough sense o f th e range o f possible proposals ah ead of timeb u t I have n o reason to expect that any will.
34 Ben d o r 2003 reviews the history of (and obstacles to) th e reception, in political science, of the m ethodological suggestion that h um an cognitive limi tations n e e d to be taken into account in theory construction.
C om puter science has a well-established m athem atical subdiscipline th at studies com putational complexity, and novice co m p u ter scientists are taught that intractability is ubiquitous. B ut it is rem arkable that, h alf a century ago, as distinguished a fou n d er o f th a t discipline as A lan Turing (1950) could be quite certain th a t a program exhibiting intelligence would ru n on the hard ware available in his day-th a t is, on what was, by o u r lights, scarcely a pocket calculator. 35See, for instance, H ayek 1989, at 143f., 149f., Hayek 1948, chaps. 2, 4, 7 9 . Invisible-hand capitalists have taken to gloating over the vindication of Hayek's attack o n socialism, b u t they may well have very sim ilar problem s; there is a growing body o f evidence th a t m arket clearing is often a com puta tionally intractable problem .
We can now give th e principled response to the rigorist rejoinder broached in n ote 26. Even if th e re is a unique equilibrium p o in t in the game of policy selection (and o f course we have n o p ro o f th a t th ere is), we have no reason to believe th a t it is com putationally accessible. If it is not, th e n it is n o t for practical purposes a solution at all. From th e stan d p o in t o f practical rea soning, a solution that it is in principle impossible to p ro d u ce is irrelevant.
36 Some dom ains may look to b e com plicated, b u t be question-begging if used as counterexam ples. I am arguing that hum ans have to negotiate th eir environm ents by deploying exceptions, rath e r th a n com plicated rules. So one should n o t slide from thinking that, say, etiq u ette looks tricky, to thinking that, because tricky problem s have to be h an d led by com plicated rules, it dis plays a h u m an ability to deploy com plicated rules. In fact, etiquette is tricky mostly because exceptions require a good deal o f delicacy a n d ju d g m e n t.
Recall th a t the C l-procedure is m eant as a rational reconstruction. T hat m eans th a t we do n o t have to walk thro u g h the proced u re aloud, b efore each action, b u t we m ust still possess the cognitive abilities needed to underw rite sensitivity to its dictates. Analogously, we do n o t write o u t parse trees before we u tter sentences, b u t the gram m atical com plexity o f the sentences we produce is lim ited by ou r cognitive capacities.
37 M embers o f a m axim hierarchy are related to on e an o th er roughly as the answers to A nscom be's fam ous series o f "Why? "-questions (1985, sect. 23) ; for work in the A nscom bian tradition that takes u p the ways in which "larger" actions em bed a n d justify "sm aller" actions, see Vogler 2003. 38 In H erm an, they are p ro m in en t as a partial solution to the so-called Prob lem o f Relevant Descriptions. It is a fam iliar poin t th a t w hether or n o t the Clprocedure rules any actions (as opposed to maxims) o u t o f o rd er dep en d s on how m uch flexibility there is in selecting a m axim to test. Actions have indefi nitely many descriptions, and o n e can always find a description o f an action that really could be m ade the rule: lying may n o t b e universalizable, b u t lying only to the naive and clueless probably is universalizable.
H erm an has realized that th e req u irem en t th a t what is checked be the psychologically actual in tention underlying the co ntem plated action, an d n ot ju s t any old description o f it, will n o t produce a recognizably m oral p attern of perm issions (and, m ore im p o rtan t from a theoretical p o in t of view, an orderly pattern ) if agents' psychologies are sufficiently idiosyncratic. If th e peculiarly tailored maxim (the one th a t slips past the C l-procedure) really does express your intent, th e n the C l-procedure will tell you th a t you can go ah ead with it. T he problem is n o t ju st th a t the C l-procedure usefully regulates only those with already very standard patterns o f motivation, while giving the strange and the psychopathic carte blanche. It is th a t necessary b u t entirely unaccounted-for regim entation of agents' m otivational structure has becom e the engine o f the theory. T his would am o u n t to failure o f the New K antian theoretical enter prise, and H erm an has devoted m uch th o u g h t an d ingenuity to forestalling it (1993, esp. chap. 4; chap. 7, sect. 4; chap. 3, sect. 3.) Maxim hierarchies can be used to provide a certain am o u n t o f anchoring against the tides o f agential idiosyncrasy, because, for any given maxim that itself passes the Cl-procedure, one can still test its superiors an d inferiors in the hierarchy, (Som ething like this move can also b e fo u n d in O 'Neil 1989, 87, w here "specific intentions" tu rn o u t to be "ancillary to m ore fundam ental intentions vr principles that m ight indeed have revealed m oral unw orthiness in the agent.") However, p erhaps m axim hierarchies d o n o t solve th e Problem o f Relevant D escriptions o n th e ir own; for all it has b een argued, an ag en t could be thoroughly perverse, all the way u p his casuistical hierarchy, in a m an n er that would slip thro u g h the C l-procedure.
K ant does give a quick argum ent th a t looks like it should be working as a reductio, b u t th a t he claims instead establishes th a t "the first subjective ground o f th e adoption of m oral m axims is inscrutable" (R 21, a n d esp. 21 n.). T h e problem is that the g round o f the free adoption of a m axim m ust be sought, n o t in any incentive o f nature, b u t in a fu rth er (freely adopted) This is radical surgery on the Kantian position th a t I h o p e can in th e end be avoided, if only because it would m ake K antian m oral theory m uch less deep, and m uch less interesting, than it has th e prom ise of being. To see how radical, recall the K antian com m itm ent to autonom y over heteronom y, and recall th a t w hether one is autonom ously or heteronom ously related to o n e 's evaluations is a m atter of how they are accepted, an d n o t a m atter o f th e ir con tent. In principle, o n e 's acceptance even of the im portance of autonom y, or o f the value of persons, could be h eteronom ous (for instance, if o ne believed that autonom y was suprem ely valuable because an authority h ad said so ). Now, in H erm an 's revision o f K ant's views, it is th e value o f persons an d o f auton omy that com e first, a n d th a t u nderw rite allegience to the Categorical Im per ative. So H erm an is advocating a "K antian" position on which o ne is to be heteronom ous with respect to o n e 's deepest and morally m ost central com m it m ents.
